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**THE ARMENIAN QUESTION AND THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA IN  
REPORTS OF THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT IN FEBRUARY – APRIL, 1920\***

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Part II

On March 4 members of the House adverted to the violations of the war laws. H. Greenwood informed the audience that from March 29 till September 21, 1919, seventy-eight Turkish war criminals had been deported to Malta; they were charged with being implicated in massacres and the cruel treatment of British prisoners of war<sup>92</sup>. D. Maclean, Major D. Davies, A. Williams and T. P. O'Connor questioned the Prime Minister about the state of affairs with regard to protection of Armenian population against further outrages. The latter had referred to the Conference's decision of appropriate obligations of France<sup>93</sup>. Henceforth, when General H. Surtees cast doubt on validity of their anxiety, D. Lloyd George answered, that all evidence as to the danger was really valid<sup>94</sup>.

Four days later, when His majesty King George V was receiving the Patriarch of Constantinople Zaven, R. Cecil asked in the House of Commons, what exactly had been doing for Armenians. He had heard that French reinforcements and fleet had been sent to Cilicia. However, the greater part of the Allied fleet did not leave the Straits and was not advancing to easy-accessible Mersin<sup>95</sup>. T. P. O'Connor had made it certain, whether the head of the Cabinet had received the latest telegram from Marash<sup>96</sup>. It was dispatched from the Patriarchate of Constantinople on February 25 and sent to the chief of the Government in the Boghos Nubar's letter of February 27<sup>97</sup>. The Prime Minister had acknowledged its receipt, as well as his awareness of the facts it contained. It is notable, that when his Secretary of State for War responded, what was the death-rate among the British prisoners of war in different countries, it proved to be 38,4% in Turkey, 8,4% in Germany and 5,2% in Austria<sup>98</sup>.

On March 9 Major D. Davies raised anew the issue of safety for Armenians. In the reply to his question what was the date of the last massacre, A. Bonar Law had not revealed any knowledge of events in Urfa, which was withstanding a siege at the moment<sup>99</sup>. The leader of the House had neither been able to

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\* Текст этой статьи на русском языке см. в: <http://research.sci.am/gmakmourian>

<sup>92</sup> Hansard, vol. 126, col. 612.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid., col. 633-634, 744.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid., col. 635.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., col. 892-893.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., col. 894.

<sup>97</sup> NAA, fund 430, reg. 1, file 1049, fol. 2-4.

<sup>98</sup> Hansard, vol. 126, col. 927.

<sup>99</sup> Hansard, vol. 126, col. 1121.

answer the queries on March 10, when deputies demanded about the Turkish peace treaty, the future of Kurds and about general losses of genocide in the Ottoman Empire during World war. On March 11 Captain C. Coote, W. Ormsby-Gore and T. P. O'Connor tried to specify the role of the Turkish Government in unceasing annihilation of Armenians. The second deputy had directly pointed out M. Kemal's connections with the Young Turks, Constantinople's parliament and its Ministry of War<sup>100</sup>. For his turn, J. Tudor-Rees had been asking the Prime Minister without result, how exactly the burning of Marash would effect the Allies' position regarding Constantinople and if anything had been done to prevent further offences<sup>101</sup>. Coming one day ahead of resolution of the London conference, R. Cecil tried to find out whether it wouldn't be worth to raise the mandate matter before the Council of the League of Nations. He had heard from D. Lloyd George that mandates were already distributed in the summer of 1919 in Paris; and now it remained to define their final terms<sup>102</sup>.

Meanwhile, everyone for a long time knew that the USA as a nominated mandatory refused on November 19, 1919, to join the League of Nations. The next vote on mandates in the Senate had been scheduled for March 19. Besides, when they talked about build-up of armaments, for example, for Air Forces, or spoke for other attractive projects, the deputies immediately recalled Armenians and started to worry about them. The Air Forces, - announced General J. Seely and C. Bellairs, - could reach the interior of Cilicia with a range of 300 miles (480 km.). "Thousands of Armenian lives could have been saved"<sup>103</sup>. With all this, they seemed to forget that on February 18 J. Wedgwood already demanded to dispatch the Navy to the shores of Cilicia, but had been refused by the First Lord of the Admiralty. On March 11 the Secretary of State for War W. Churchill carried on the course of his colleague; he complained of great intermixture of the Armenian and Turkish population. In his opinion, their close juxtaposition led to frequent massacres, though it strongly prevented the air bombings<sup>104</sup>. At the same time, he had no objection to application of the Air Forces in Palestine, Egypt and Mesopotamia.

J. Kenworthy and W. Benn had rejoined that lake Van or the Republic of Erivan didn't yield at all to the mentioned areas. As to Adana, it was easily accessible from the coast<sup>105</sup>. The first deputy conveyed a complaint of his interlocutor from the Republic of Armenia, that "if one-tenth of the expenditure that has been lavished and wasted in Russia had been used to support the

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<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 1511.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 1534.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 1535.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 1601. See also: col. 1603, 1605, 1643.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 1621.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 1638, 1644. See also opinion of M. Kemal, expressed by J. Seely on March 18: col.2445.

Armenians, we should have had none of those massacres and outrages”<sup>106</sup>. Besides, the Air Forces could operate against the military camps of M. Kemal, which were accessible from the Black Sea shores; and Trebizond is located much nearer to the Western Armenia than the Straits are. Otherwise all disputes over new expenditures manifested ferocious militarism. The Ottoman territories, H. Barnes continued, had always been an apple of discord. And “it would not be unfair to presume that probably the real cause of the War was the determination of the German Empire to obtain supremacy in this part of the world”<sup>107</sup>. As far as at the current situation Great Britain had neither rivals, nor might to control all accessible to her regions, it had to be better to delegate control and responsibility to the League of Nations<sup>108</sup>.

On the eve of the British occupation of Constantinople, on March 15, A. T. Davies, E. Winterton and A. Williams appealed to the Parliament with new interpellations on Marash; in that connection the third deputy had reminded that at the time of British occupation its Commanders required to disarm local inhabitants<sup>109</sup>. The Prime Minister had responded that detachments, camped at Bosphorus, had been increased significantly. R. Cecil had complained that the Minister representing the Foreign Office at the Parliament rejected both the Kemalists’ plot to annihilate Marash, and their connections with the Government of Sultan. Meantime, the very same day, on March 11, head of the Foreign Office G. Curzon stated, that “the trouble in Cilicia was part of a definite Nationalist program directed in the interest of the Young Turk Party, designed with the object of seizing any occasion for massacring the Armenians, and that there has been a constant interchange of communications between the Capital and the Nationalist Forces in Asia Minor, and that Mustapha Kemal, as official governor of Erzerum, was a link between Constantinople and Asia”<sup>110</sup>.

It would be proper to add, that on March 16, the very day of occupation of Constantinople, in the response to the direct question for D. Lloyd George if he would make a statement in the House on the Turkish question, A. Bonar Law responded that he *could not add anything*<sup>111</sup>. The Government did not “contemplate any use of force at this moment”<sup>112</sup>. At that time, British army of the Black Sea comprised of 24,5 thousand men<sup>113</sup>. It was noteworthy that importance of the Straits had been stressed at the days, when they had been losing Batum and had known about A. Denikin’s withdrawal from Ekaterinodar. It was also remarkable, that being deprived of the capability to control Baku, they started to specify their Persian oil interests.

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<sup>106</sup> **Hansard**, vol. 126, col. 1639. See also: **Hansard**, vol. 127, col. 159.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 126, col. 1653.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 1653-1654.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 1804.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 1810.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 2016.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 2041.

Next day after the occupation and concurrently with the Kemalists' ultimatum, addressed to the defenders of Hajin, A. Williams raised a question as to conditions in that city<sup>114</sup>. Couldn't we help these people, if they are not protected by French, - the deputy worried. Sir H. Greenwood expressed his confidence, that the French forces did everything they could. And H. Asquith had been interested what exactly was happening on Bosphorus. "In consequence of the atrocities which have occurred in Anatolia and of the hostile attitude, persisted in by the Turkish forces and authorities"<sup>115</sup>, - A. Bonar Law explained, - we were forced to capture this city. It would be seized till the Turks duly executed the terms of the Peace treaty; and if they commit new outrages against the Christians, the terms of the peace would be made more severe<sup>116</sup>. D. Lloyd George added, that only the Allies would determine the future of the taken away Ottoman territories. This phrase gave concern, as far as Cilicia was not protected and there was no one to detach the ruined Western Armenia away from the Empire.

On March 22 T. P. O'Connor reverted to the situation in Hajin and to the debility of the French forces<sup>117</sup>. C. Harmsworth had referred to the report, drawn up by R. Cecil the very same day; he had promised to make inquiries and then to give an account. General J. Davidson added, that Allies' activity would not disturb Kemalist detachments in the interior of Anatolia<sup>118</sup>. His colleague General G. Cockerill made it certain, that comparing with 1914, British forces had increased after the war by 20 thousand men. When useful, growth of the military expenditures had been immediately justified by the necessity to defend Armenians<sup>119</sup> and peace on the planet by means of the League of Nations. Creation of the League was interpreting precisely as a necessity *to increase* military personnel, as far as collective security demanded additional efforts<sup>120</sup>. W. Ormsby-Gore had supplemented, that such a task implied intervention and elaboration of tactical schemes all over the world. The deputy had remarked large sums, fixed at the budget for the Near East; he had asked at once, what was the specific purpose to keep a battalion of imperial Indian troops in Adana<sup>121</sup>.

W. Ormsby-Gore noted both a bulk of weapons in the area, and anarchy, evoked by so long conduct of negotiations for the Treaty. The deputy appealed: "We shall not attempt to take up more than we can chew"<sup>122</sup>. It was true, that Armenians of the Diarbekir province were in peril. "Let us supply them with arms and the means of self-defense, but do not let us make promises to them

<sup>114</sup> **Hansard**, vol. 126, col. 2200-2201.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 2211.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 2215.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 127, col. 51-52.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 94.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 132-133, 154-156.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 96-97, 107, 110, 127.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 102.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 104.

unless we are prepared to send the necessary military force to them to protect them”<sup>123</sup>. The deputy proposed to keep the British garrison in Batum instead of Diarbekir, and laid stress on stabilizing role of the first. Lieutenant-Colonel W. Guinness seconded his colleague: M. Kemal could not be quelled without application of force; and that might require reinforcements and common efforts of the whole Cabinet<sup>124</sup>.

Peoples, which turned out to be at the break-up of the Turkish and the Russian Empires, [first of all – Armenians], had fall a prey to actions that we completed in the past, - A. Williams developed this subject. “The troops which were stationed in the Caucasus ought never to have been withdrawn. ...There has been a great deal of fighting between the three new States of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, which might have been prevented, and would have been, I think, if our troops had been kept there doing what was practically police duty”<sup>125</sup>. British regular troops were substituted for military missions, subordinated to the Foreign Office, - A. Williams continued. They were sent “to guide, and in some sense, control those three States and bring about peace between them, and arrange differences as to frontiers and make treaties of arbitration one with the other. It is through the influence of those British officers that to some extent good results have been brought about. I earnestly hope we shall see more British officers in those three States, because I am quite sure if serious bloodshed is to be avoided, it is absolutely necessary that there should be some power there or somebody with great influence to guide those new States”<sup>126</sup>.

We can add, that border arbitration had been nonrandom topic in the British Parliament. In parallel with formation of the Armenian-Turkish boundary, on March 5 J. Wardrop enquired A. Khatisian from Tiflis, what kind of the Caucasian frontiers was acceptable for the Republic of Armenia<sup>127</sup>; and leaders of Armenian delegations in London had informed D. Lloyd George that their State was ready to admit military and civil advisers<sup>128</sup>. In order to influence the border issue, on March 12 G. Curzon transmitted in London a letter for A. Aharonian; it charged Armenians with use of violence against Tartars in the Republic of Armenia. Three days later Boghos Nubar sent to the head of the Foreign Office and to D. Lloyd George denial of this accusations<sup>129</sup>; and on March 18 he received an answer<sup>130</sup>, that Britain was ready to furnish Armenia with arms. The next day leaders of two Armenian delegations and H. Khan Massehian decided to offer to the London conference arbitration of the

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<sup>123</sup> *Hansard*, vol. 127, col. 104.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 118.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 154-155.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.* col. 155.

<sup>127</sup> *NAA, fund 200, reg. 1, file. 556, pt. 1, fol. 42-43, 46.*

<sup>128</sup> *NAA, fund 430, reg. 1, file 1050, fol. 4.*

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*, file 1047, fol. 12.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*, file 1050, fol. 14.

Transcaucasian border lines<sup>131</sup>.

On the same March 19 “The Times” published an article with a figure of 198 damaged Tartar villages in Armenia<sup>132</sup>. And on March 20 G. Korganian submitted to the secretariat of the Conference already mentioned memorandum on “Activities of the foreign military mission in the Republic of Armenia.” Simultaneously, “The Times” printed an article on the threat of massacre for Hajin, Urfa, Birejik and Aintab<sup>133</sup>, together with the text of Turkish-Azerbaijan military convention<sup>134</sup>. At last, on March 23 A.-M. Topchibashev met, at his desire, with A. Aharonian, Boghos Nubar and H. Khan Massehian in London<sup>135</sup>, learning their opinion on arbitration issue. And on the same March 23, responding to the English blames, Azerbaijan forces in common with irregular bands, massacred Shushi; from 8, up to 9 thousands of souls were killed in its clashes<sup>136</sup>. Along with this city, 40 villages had been annihilated, too<sup>137</sup>. Notwithstanding this fact, on March 26 A. Khatisian sent a letter to J. Wardrop, which contained Caucasian frontiers of the Republic of Armenia; he had noted that the border line should embrace Kazakh, Zangezour and the great part of Karabagh<sup>138</sup>.

What depended on the British Parliament, here J. Kenworthy continued debates on March 22. He called to enlarge the Army, because “we had a peace to end peace; *such Peace Treaties* as we seem likely to have *are not Peace Treaties* at all, but, unless they *are* modified, means to lead straight to another war”<sup>139</sup>, – proclaimed the Colonel. “The cause of unrest in Turkey is simply owing to the delay in the Peace Treaty and the terms of the Peace Treaty given to the Turkish representatives who went to Paris”<sup>140</sup>. The Armenians had always asked for means of self-defense, however, the British “were so engaged in interfering with other countries, which did not want [them], that [they] left the

<sup>131</sup> NAA, fund 200, reg. 1, file 290, fol. 83.

<sup>132</sup> “Times,” Lnd., 19.03.1920, stored at: NAA, fund 200, reg. 1, file 427, pt. 1, fol. 146. A. Aharonian’s account of this article for A. Khatisian see in: NAA, fund 200, reg. 1, file 290, pt. 1, fol. 81.

<sup>133</sup> “Times,” Lnd., 20.03.1920, stored at: NAA, fund 200, reg. 1, file 427, pt. 1, fol. 147.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.* A. Aharonian’s account of this article for A. Khatisian: NAA, fund 200, reg. 1, file 290, pt. 1, fol. 91. Another article with the similar content see in: “Times,” Lnd., 26.03.1920, stored at: NAA, fund 200, reg. 1, file 427, pt. 1, fol. 155. Inquiry regarding this convention was made at the 2<sup>nd</sup> conference of the republics of Transcaucasia in Tiflis on 16.04.1920: NAA, fund 200, reg. 1, file 576, fol. 3.

<sup>135</sup> NAA, fund 200, reg. 1, file 290, pt. 1, fol. 89-90.

<sup>136</sup> See the telegram by A. Khatisian for J. Wardrop and other representatives of the Allies in Tiflis, dispatched a week later: NAA, fund 200, reg. 1, file 486, pt. 2, fol. 143. Intelligence news summary of 5.04.1920 on activities of the official Baku: NAA, fund 200, reg. 1, file 427, pt. 2, fol. 250-250 reverse. Protests of the Armenian delegation at the 2<sup>nd</sup> conference of the republics of Transcaucasia in Tiflis on 17, 19.04.1920 see: NAA, fund 200, reg. 1, file 576, fol. 5 rev. - 7 rev., 11 rev.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*, file 576, fol. 4 rev.

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*, file 556, pt. 1, fol. 62. On the similar position of the Parliament of the Republic of Armenia in Yerevan and of A. Aharonian in London see accordingly: NAA, fund 200, reg. 1, file 486, pt. 2, fol. 140-141 and file 290, pt. 1, fol. 90.

<sup>139</sup> **Hansard**, vol. 127, col. 159.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*

Armenian problem alone, and failed in [their] duty there”<sup>141</sup>. Hence, a lot of people were suffering.

Rejecting his words, W. Churchill conveyed, that with the spring warming Bolsheviks would arrive at the borders of “the doubtful Republics of Azerbaijan and Georgia,” and would come into contact with the Kemalists<sup>142</sup>. Even so, it was not excluded that they would prefer an opportunity to propagate their ideology to territories. The next day, on March 23, A. Buckley enquired, to what extent British military stores in the South Russia were valuable. W. Churchill answered that they were of considerable value<sup>143</sup>; although munitions for the Armenian Army had been conveyed neither from there nor from Constantinople, but from London.

As regards the defeat of A. Denikin, N. Maclean consoled the presents: Soviet Russia needed rails, locomotives and goods of every description. This merchandise would be helpful in its development and was profitable for England.

Adverting to the matter of Cilicia, General H. Surtees had unsuccessfully attempted to clear out the role of the Oriental legion; and whether the French had not provoked Turkish assaults in Marash, when they hoisted their flag over the citadel. On March 24 J. Kenworthy proceeded with this issue; he had been interested in capability of Greece to exert pressure on the Western flank, and to what extent Great Britain was prepared to assist such an operation. A. Bonar Law answered him: “We have come under no obligations of any kind”<sup>144</sup>.

Instead, from September of 1919, the State had assumed an obligation to sustain its foreign commerce. Now British exporters could sell their wares by installments, spreading accounts over 3 years. 80% of commodity’s cost was paid them back by the Treasury at once. For his turn, purchaser should make a deposit and pay annual interest. Taking into account, that this scheme was applicable to the Southern-Eastern areas of Russia, C. Malone proposed to recognize Republics of Transcaucasia de jure, and then to allot credits not to individual exporters, but to the Governments of these States<sup>145</sup>. His discourse was of practical significance, because forms of the payment by the Republic of Armenia for the British weapons were discussed at the same time.

On March 25 J. Kenworthy interpellated, if A. Denikin had parleyed with Georgia and Azerbaijan (with Armenia he did negotiate); and whether British employees participated in adjustment of Caucasian disputes. It had been revealed, that representatives of A. Denikin worked with all regional Governments.

Afterwards, A. Williams reverted deputies’ attention to the fate of Christian women and children in Turkish harems; and also to the possibility to protect people of diverse races in the Ottoman Asia. “There is no part of the world in which the continuance of unsettlement is more pregnant with trouble and even

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<sup>141</sup> **Hansard**, vol. 127, col. 159.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 186.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 268. See also: col. 1920.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 401.

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 564.

with danger”<sup>146</sup>,- H. Asquith replied and immediately centered their dispute on Europe. The continuance of the Ottoman rule here had been called a dangerous anachronism. “The control of the Straits... is no longer to be in the hands” of this Empire. “I think it is an open secret,- the man, who was the Prime Minister in 1908-1916 confessed, - that His Majesty’s Government for a long time, almost up to the end, were in favor of the actual expulsion of the Turk from Constantinople”<sup>147</sup>.

That confession was in sharp contrast with the statements, reverberant before the occupation of the city. It serves an argument for submission to the readers my conclusion about gravity of the British intentions towards the zone of Bosphorus. After all, H. Asquith added, Moslem sentiment in India was a matter of secondary importance. “The Sultan joined the Central Powers in this War without justification, and indeed without provocation”<sup>148</sup>. It had led the Empire to well-deserved defeat; and Caliph could not escape his share of liability. The more, since the Allies had agreed to internationalize and to neutralize the Straits.

Afterwards, the orator turned to the future status of Armenia and to the matter of its border delimitation. H. Asquith asked, where exactly did Armenian or Christian population preponderate in Cilicia after the recent massacres? Actually, what was wanted, was “a liberal extension westwards, and perhaps south-westwards, of the present limits of the new Republic of Erivan; and at the same time, though I am afraid it is not in a position to stand entirely upon its own legs and to live entirely upon its own resources, the provision for that Republic of more effective means of self defense”<sup>149</sup>. Giving proper weight to terrible events of 1915 and of January-February of 1920, weapons and European officers should be dispatched without delay, otherwise “the recurrence of massacre and outrage [would be] only a question of time”<sup>150</sup>. Meanwhile, the ex-Premier told that military and political strategy compelled to advance to the shores of the Black and Caspian seas.

In response to this speech, his successor D. Lloyd George had reminded validity of reason, why the British waited for specification of the US position. Wasn’t it that the United States were offered to undertake a trusteeship of all Armenians, Cilicia included; to guard Constantinople and the Straits; and to execute control over the Turkish authorities throughout the Asia Minor<sup>151</sup>. President of the USA had asked to wait till August-September of 1919. However, it had been March of 1920 already; and “the delay had undoubtedly aggravated unrest in Turkey and had intensified the whole of our difficulties

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<sup>146</sup> *Hansard*, vol. 127, col. 640.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 641.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 643.

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 644.

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 656.

there<sup>152</sup>. Till now, the Cabinet preferred to deteriorate the situation but not to worsen relations. Meanwhile, Armenian population was much scattered. "There is only one part of Turkey where you can say that the Armenians are in the majority. By no principle of self-determination can you add to the Republic of Armenia territories like Cilicia"<sup>153</sup>. The operating Premier was of the opinion, that after recent massacres at Marash Kemalists gravely upset the balance of population for benefit of Moslem inhabitants.

He had produced for retorting H. Asquith figures of 130 thousands of Armenians, 36 thousands of Greeks and 18 thousands of other inhabitants of Cilicia in opposition to 548 thousands of Moslems there<sup>154</sup>. His opponent called these proportions unbelievable and not conceivable. After several reservations D. Lloyd George added that now the Armenians, and the Christians in general, had become a minority. Hence, they could not be granted self-government without strict control. In the reply to A. Williams's interpellation, whether it was possible to recognize the majority created by the massacres, head of the Cabinet retorted, that he ought to proceed from the facts as they were; although he "had no doubt that the horrible massacres upset the balance of population"<sup>155</sup>. The USA had not accepted responsibility; and Britain "cannot police the whole world"<sup>156</sup>. It was true that their Empire possessed navy; however, such a service cost considerably; this was defined as the main trouble with regard to Cilicia. Therefore, England ought to content itself with control in the Straits area.

At the same time, the head of the Cabinet passed over in silence, that 200 thousand ready to move refugees had gathered on the shores of Bosphorus alone. Let's also remark, that Cilicia had been rejected its Armenian identity not before, but *after* the landing operation in Constantinople; also the latter was carried out with the alleged aims to punish for Marash and to help survivors.

We can not give any pledges that we would sent forces into Anatolia, - continued the spokesperson. "With regard to the Republic of Erivan, which is Armenian, it depends entirely on the Armenians themselves, whether they protect their independence. They must do so; they must begin to depend upon themselves"<sup>157</sup>. The Republic of Armenia could draft an army of 40 thousands of men; and British would "be very happy to assist in equipping their army"<sup>158</sup>. including advisor-officers. Whereas continuous appeals and applications provoked Turks to new crimes. Afterwards the Prime Minister went on to the points of Mosul and the League of Nations, but R. Cecil had turned to Cilicia again. The situation there had deteriorated badly, because "the Turks shot down so many of the Armenians that there no longer was a majority or even an

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<sup>152</sup> **Hansard**, vol. 127, col. 657.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 659.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 660.

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 661.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*

equality”<sup>159</sup> for them. This region could not be handed back to Turkey. Such a solution would urge the Kemalists to put an end to the Armenian presence there. His critic made a reference to the League, which would protect *Armenians*, once again. Sir Robert tried to concretize this reference; he proposed that League could collect money from all its members. After all, to leave Cilicia completely unaided meant to evoke disaster there. He himself compared this region with Mesopotamia.

A. Murray had broken into a debate. He could not understand why they should expect for the US participation after the month of October, 1919, when this country had refused the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations with its mandate system. The deputy concurred with H. Asquith, that his Empire had to establish Georgia and Azerbaijan as firmly as possible and to create an independent Armenia in order to fortify its own positions in Mesopotamia. Nevertheless, ascertained J. Kenworthy, in spite of promises made in the past, “we have nothing left now for the Armenians”<sup>160</sup>: Great Britain could not afford anything to help them. The language of the Prime Minister with regard to his speech, had aroused T. P. O’Connor’s misgiving; wasn’t it that the Armenians themselves preferred the European control of Cilicia to Constantinople. “One cannot see how a people should be willing to regard a butchery, which makes a minority still more a minority as a justification for a continuance of the rule of the people responsible for the butchery”<sup>161</sup>. Leaders of the British Empire had substituted the Treaty of Berlin for the Treaty of San Stephano and exposed the Armenians to new butchery, - T. P. O’Connor continued; - and responsibility for this nefarious policy rests with our country .

After a short adjournment, A. Hailwood examined on March 29, if the British promises to allot weapons to the Republic of Armenia were in force; and the next day A. Williams interpellated about Hajin. He investigated, if the French recommended to evacuate the women and children from there without suitable escort; if they didn’t direct a detachment to the city, thus leaving its inhabitants to their fate; and whether Armenians enrolled volunteers, although all communications out of Adana were severed since March 19; and whether women and children were moved from Sis to Adana, while the fights were taking place in its vicinities. Besides, what steps would be taken by his British Government, as far as large numbers of refugees were sent back to Cilicia by its efforts?

C. Harmsworth replied, that the nearest French forces were at Marash, 80 kilometers distant of Hajin; situation at the second city caused anxiety, but no definite menace existed at the moment. Besides, the French could not dispatch protectors, but they addressed the proper demands to the Turkish Government at Constantinople. A. Williams added that he had received several hours ago ter-

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<sup>159</sup> **Hansard**, vol. 127, col. 669.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 711.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 718.

rible news about inactivity of the French Command and about further spread of massacres. Would the Porte be told that, in accordance with our warnings, they were going to lose Constantinople for the continuous extermination of Armenians? Reminding, what arguments in particular were used to substantiate the seizure of the Straits, deputy tried to clarify the whole pattern; however, he had heard that territory of Cilicia was outside the jurisdiction of English authorities<sup>162</sup>.

At the same time, envoys from Hajin, city where 5-7-storeyed buildings were raised, reached on March 5 Adana to plead for help. Group, headed by the Archbishop P. Sarajian, had informed that 8 thousands of Armenian lives were under threat. On March 9 these people, who elected K. Chalian their chief, already found themselves in close siege. Although they did not possess French troops, and hence Kemalists had no argument to ground their attack, on March 17 dwellers of Hajin received an ultimatum. On April 1-12 they went into fierce actions. Led by S. Jebejian and Kaitzak Aram (Terzian), 1200 participants of self-defense repulsed the enemy attacks on April 30, May 20-23, June 8-9, 25 and on July 11-13. On September 20 they even organized successful counter-attack. Hajin managed to remain intact till October 14-15; nevertheless, none of the Allies had sent him reinforcement. As a result, 6 thousands of persons were massacred without distinction to their sex and age. Only 378 members of defense managed to break apart the ring of death and come out of encirclement.

On March 31 A. Williams talked once again of ruined Marash, and of imminent danger for Aintab and Hajin. He cited data which came within the last two days and applied to the founded by dwellers of Hajin and massacred village Shar<sup>163</sup>. The deputy reported that thousands of Armenians were asking arms of the French to go and relieve the people besieged. He had read a letter from Adana, dated March 10; it testified the planned character of Turkish actions. Taking this city in a semi-circle, drawn from Selefke till Islahie and cutting the railway in several places, organized into bands the regular military moved towards the metropolis of Cilicia. Only giving arms to the Armenian population could give some hope, but “what [had] happened in the past, caused... the greatest possible anxiety as to what would happen in the immediate future”<sup>164</sup>. Wasn’t it, that without guard of mountainous Cilicia there was no way to provide safety for Mediterranean districts. Meanwhile, having sent on insufficient number of troops, the French didn’t cooperate with native Christians. A. Williams warned that at the next session they could “hear that 10,000 people had been massacred at Hajin or... somewhere else, that possibly Adana itself was seized”<sup>165</sup>.

He reminded that in November of 1919, when the British handed over Cilicia to the French, they had not asked consent of the native population. R. Cecil

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<sup>162</sup> **Hansard**, vol. 127, col. 1091-1093, 1341.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 1341.

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 1342.

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 1343.

had assisted the statement, made by A. William. Sir Robert had mentioned, that Armenians fought in the French Army because they obtained a pledge to be liberated from the Ottoman yoke<sup>166</sup>. The Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs C. Harmsworth responded that telegrams and information, cited by A. Williams, were “usually ample and extraordinarily accurate”<sup>167</sup>. And though the Cabinet shared deputy’s anxiety, “whatever [their] past obligations might have been, to individual Armenians in Cilicia, or large bodies of Armenians for that matter”<sup>168</sup>, at the present situation he had no power to be able to help inhabitants.

Colonel H. Greig had reminded him, that there were two Armenias. The Northern one probably would be made independent and autonomous; as to Cilicia, it had been transferred to France and should have nothing to do with the other Armenians. C. Harmsworth approved the suggested wording. He had accepted that the French were not in a position to repulse the Kemalists’ attacks, but had promised retaliatory measures in the Straits.

After the adjournment, the Parliament resumed its work on April 12. The London conference had just come to an end; and on April 14 H. Asquith saw it off with several noteworthy avowals. He had announced, that it was exactly the British pro-Turkish policy of 1913, which urged Bulgaria to join the enemy coalition; while Turkey could not receive German munitions of war without Bulgaria and was not able to keep Gallipoli during the war<sup>169</sup>. It meant that Britons antagonized potential ally, so as to reinforce an adversary of Entente at the precious for them Turkish flank. And they, of course, intended “to punish” after the war this, discontented by their efforts State, for its unwarranted joining the Central Powers. As a result, we may generalize that members of British Parliament gave publicity to many notable facts and political confessions at their sessions of February - April, 1920. First of all, their debates testified extensive and very unbounded utilization of the Armenian Question, which was easily recalled, when deputies had to ground an increase of Army manpower or military expenditure, occupation of Constantinople or to justify annexation of the Straits. At the same time, numerous speeches on Cilicia and on distress of Armenians, who repatriated there with assistance of the Allies, did not lead to any definite actions. Desperate situation in Cilicia was used as a pretext for occupation of Constantinople; afterwards this country was left to its cruel fate and to openly admitted feebleness of the French Command. Equally, Britons made no secret, that they reinforced independent Republic of Armenia against Soviet rule at a time, when military potential of White troops was exhausted.

As such, Parliamentary debates had been giving an opportunity to make scores of useful political observations, which were worthy of notice in 1920; and merit attention now.

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<sup>166</sup> **Hansard**, vol. 127, col. 1345.

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 1349.

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>169</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 1707.

**ՀԱՅԿԱԿԱՆ ՀԱՐՑԸ ԵՎ ՀԱՅԱՍՏԱՆԻ ՀԱՆՐԱՊԵՏՈՒԹՅՈՒՆԸ ԲՐԻՏԱՆԱԿԱՆ ԽՈՐՀՐԴԱՐԱՆԻ 1920 Թ. ՓԵՏՐՎԱՐ-ԱՊՐԵԼ ԱՍԻՄՆԵՐԻ ՀԱՇՎԵՏՎՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐՈՒՄ**

ՄԱԽՄՐՅԱՆ Գ. Գ.  
(Հայաստանի Հանրապետություն, ք. Երևան)

**Ամփոփում**

1920 թ. փետրվար-ապրիլ ամիսներին Մեծ Բրիտանիայի խորհրդարանում տեղի ունեցած բանավեճը վկայում է Հայկական հարցի լայն ու չափազանց ազատ օգտագործման մասին: Դա հիշատակվում էր այն ժամանակ, երբ հարկավոր էր հիմնավորել բանակի մեծացումը կամ ռազմական ծախսերի ավելացումը, Կ. Պոլսի գրավումը կամ նեղուցների զավթումն արդարացնելը: Միևնույն ժամանակ, Կիլիկիայի և Դաշնակիցների եռանդուն մասնակցությամբ այնտեղ վերադարձած հայերի աղետալի դրության մասին բազմաթիվ ձայները չէին հանգում գործուն միջոցների կիրառման: Կիլիկիայի ծանր իրավիճակն օգտագործվել է որպես Կ. Պոլսի գրավելու առիթ, այնուհետև այն թողել են բախտի քմահաճույքին ու ֆրանսիական հրամանատարության հանրաճանաչ անգործությանը: Անգլիացիները չէին թաքցնում, որ ամրացնելով անկախ Հայաստանի Հանրապետությունը, իրենք հետապնդում էին հակախորհրդային նպատակներ, այն էլ այն պահին, երբ սպիտակգվարդիականների մարտունակությունն արդեն սպառվել էր: Պատգամավորների ելույթները բազմաթիվ քաղաքական դիտարկումների հնարավորություն էին տալիս, որոնք հիշարժան էին և օգտակար ինչպես 1920 թ., այնպես էլ այսօր:

**АРМЯНСКИЙ ВОПРОС И РЕСПУБЛИКА АРМЕНИЯ  
В ОТЧЕТАХ БРИТАНСКОГО ПАРЛАМЕНТА ЗА ФЕВРАЛЬ – АПРЕЛЬ 1920 Г.**

МАХМУРЯН Г. Г.  
(Республика Армения, г. Ереван)

**Резюме**

Дебаты в британском Парламенте в феврале-апреле 1920 г. свидетельствовали о широкой и очень свободной манипуляции Армянским вопросом, о котором вспоминали в связи с обоснованием вопроса об увеличении армии или военных расходов, занятии Константинополя или оправдании аннексии проливов. В то же время многочисленные речи о Киликии и бедственном положении возвращавшихся туда с помощью союзников армян не приводили к конкретным шагам. Тяжелое положение Киликии использовали в качестве повода для занятия Константинополя, а затем ее оставили на произвол судьбы и открыто признававшуюся беспомощность французского командования. Англичане не скрывали, что они стремились укрепить независимую Республику Армению в антисоветских целях, причем в тот момент, когда военные возможности белогвардейцев уже были исчерпаны. Сами по себе выступления депутатов дают возможность сделать много полезных политических наблюдений, заслуживавших внимания как в 1920 г., так и сегодня.