After the World War I, all European states were divided by H. Hoover as Chairman of the American Food Administration, J. H. Barnes as President of the Grain Corporation, A. Taylor and R. Taft as advisers, and Hoover’s secretary L. Strauss, into 5 groups. Transcaucasia was placed at the third group, where people “were destitute of everything - credit, food, raw materials and ships”. Its countries had “wholly inexperienced” representative governments, enduring heavy pressure of czarism and communism. Turkey did not possess even acceptable government; and peoples of the third and fourth groups were dying in the midst of war. The fifth - Soviet Russia, resisted to collapse and hunger, yet her ideas badly disturbed the rest of society.

The United States’ post-war scenario was clear: this country should continue its trade and lend bread on long-term loans. As the USA had transformed into the main carrier and intermediary between two continents, new markets should be gained peacefully. Those who could not pay immediately should be awarded the charity and afforded time. According to H. Hoover’s scheme, his country should not shape new boundaries or cancel European debts, which companions “could never pay” without America’s special efforts. So, the Congress should credit its national agriculture and trade across the Atlantic on the state level. In his turn, President W. Wilson didn’t want the large-scale arm races with Britain, bitter confrontation with Russia or other acute problems. His plan of the League of Nations stimulated national industry. And his idea of equal access to consumers, rather than to raw materials was a hint.

H. Hoover’s scheme and international League of W. Wilson were rivals, to some extent. First plan prevised new state agencies, including the United States Food Administration (AFA), functioning from May 9, 1917 to February 7, 1919. This body controlled the first and the last ope-

2 Hoover H., *p. 283.*
rations of the wheat trade. It bought the crop from farmers and exported it, having moderate 18.2% income. At Constantinople, for example, 20,278 tons of flour was sent in cash to local merchants with the limit of adoptable retail. As a result, the prices dropped in half overnight.

The U.S. Congress had allotted $150 millions, and the Grain Corporation of AFA commenced its work with Herbert Hoover as Chairman. The state agency was buying wheat and handing it over to ferrymen; then it was distributing grain among refugees through its officers. National employees imposed immediate and strict control over traders’ activity. As a result, in 1918-1919 the USA export grew from 41% to 53.5% of provisions, consumed by the Allies. The latter side proposed to the President W. Wilson complete “world controls of the economic life of earth to continue for some years.” In return, European partners asked to reduce prices. The American answer, compiled by H. Hoover on November 13, 1918 was negative. The author stated, that the economic force “may be a powerful assistance in enabling us to secure acceptance of our view”4.

The U.S. Food Administration and the U.S. Grain Corporation began their activity in Paris on December 12, 1918. W. Wilson arrived on December 15, and the world leaders appointed H. Hoover as Director of Relief and Rehabilitation. He had at his disposal 2,500 employees and $325 millions of America’s direct charity.5 Evaluating the situation in the Near East, H. Hoover and J. Harbord observed a bit later, that Armenia had endured the largest imaginable losses and suffering. This people could not recover from appalling tragedy of 1915-18 without outer interference. The danger to disappear as a national unit was very real for them. The American society had been well acquainted with the situation in Western Armenia, thanks to its missionaries, merchants and diplomats.

In September of 1915 the Armenian Relief Committee of J. L. Barton was established in New York. In October of 1916 W. Wilson declared a two-day national campaign of fundraising. By the end of 1918 the sum of donations exceeded $11 millions; although after May 28, 1918 with

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4 Ibid., p. 278, 289, 396.
the Armenian independence as a reality, this sum had not yet been available for the new state. Till the Mudros Armistice of October 30 the Republic of Armenia with its Eastern and Western Armenian refugees combined, was gravely endangered and devastated. During the war help was practically not available. Representative of the Caucasian branch of the ARC, J. Elder stayed in Armenia alone and without funds.

The Armenian authority adopted on September 28, October 8, 11, 26, November 4, 23, December 3 and 28 nine laws on relief\(^6\). Refugees should be supplied with work and idle lands, abandoned bowers should be repaired, private and state weaving shops and orphanages were to be opened; medical-sanitary care to be organized; the 2nd Congress of the Western Armenians to be convened; fund were allotted for victims from Baku and for escapees in Georgia, Persia. On November 23, 1918 the Armenian Parliament decided to loan one million roubles to the American ARC for 3 months, bearing no interest. Actually, this sum was not available till December 14, and till the end of the year\(^7\).

Only after the end of war situation had rather changed. If starving to death victims of Genocide had evoked energetic philanthropy; then the Armenian Republic that emerged from the outbreak of the Russian revolutions, demanded a little bit different approach. Now this society had its local administration, backed by the British troops. Those troops who evaluated might of bayonets not beneath might of dollar.

Initially, W. Wilson did not reject Western Armenian mandate and he proposed General J. Harbord as its executive. In its turn, H. Hoover endeavored to separate relief from politics and tasks, related with the repatriation of Western Armenians. When on February 24, 1919 the U.S. Congress passed into law the “Hundred Million Dollar Appropriation” and to cash this sum replaced AFA by the American Relief Administration (ARA); Chairman of ARA bitterly criticized the American Committee for Relief in the Near East (ACRNE) for its malfunction. He aspired to override all relief activity, and to separate Transcaucasian offices from the agencies in the Straits. Only in July of 1919 he succeeded in nomination of his candidate, Colonel W. Haskell, as Managing Director of ACRNE (or Near East Relief, from August 1), and

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\(^6\) NAA 200/1/86/ f. 6A-14, 20; \(\text{Σημειώσεις} \ Οικονομικής \ Πληρωμής \ Αντιπροσώπου \ Αμερικής \ (1918-1920 \ ζελ)\): \(\text{Τοποθέτηση} \ \text{U. Υπ' Ραπάτω} \ ι \ \text{προ.} \ \text{μαύριο. Υπ' Ραπάτω, β. Υπερβλητήσματα: (Οριζόντια, ΙΙΙ Υπόλοιπα σπηλιά, ΙΙΙ Υποχρεωτικά μηδενιστικά μηνυματικά συμπλήρωμα αργηφ), 6-8, 11-12, 15-16, 20, 31.}

\(^7\) NAA 370/1/34/ f. 15-15A.
as Allied High Commissioner (for relief) in Armenia. The Committee’s network for relief was founded at the beginning of January, 1919. A wave of philanthropy had been guided by the Chairman of the national organization A. C. James and C. Dodge, who gathered funds, raised by the churches. The State granted cargoes. Notwithstanding these measures, reports by Major E. R. Stoever and H. Heinz, sent from Constantinople in the middle of February, the memorandum by A. Aharonian to the secretariat of the Peace conference, dated March 3 announced the state of emergency in Armenia. There were 500 thousands of refugees at the spot, 250 thousands of them were “at the absolute point of death, and all would be out of food in 20 days”. First packs of provision, clothing and medicine had arrived at Batum, but very few of them reached the blockaded republic. Because of grave mismanagement, the local Director of the Committee was dismissed, and the majority of employees had been arrested. H. Heinz insisted that supplies for Armenia should be arranged through Hoover’s headquarters of ARA in Paris.

300 new persons with supplies came to Constantinople in March. They were guided by the Managing Director of ACRNE, Major J. A.

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9 On April 4, 1919 Minister of Interior A. Khatisian noted for Armenian Foreign Ministry, that they had 316,000 refugees in the Republic, 208,000 of them were Western Armenians and 108,000 from the Karas province; plus 28,000 refugees in Georgia, unknown number in the North Caucasus and around 50,000 in the Western Armenia itself. Two days later A. Aharonian wrote to the Paris Peace conference about 350,000 Western Armenian refugees there. On June 19 A. Tulin from the ARA witnessed for 600,000 escapees in the Caucasus. On July 3 H. Hoover and H. Morgenthau wrote in the memorandum that there were 750,000 refugees in the Caucasus and Republic of Armenia. This number should include the refugees in Persia, too. Five days later W. Thwaites estimated 650,000 souls. At the end of August J. A. Davis reported about 400-500,000 refugees in the republic, Western and Eastern Armenians combined. Armenian memorandum for the Peace conference bore 350-400,000 Western Armenians here plus 100-150,000 Caucasian escapees. Heads of the ABCFM J. L. Barton and W. Peet noted, that 300,000 lives are to perish in the new state without outer help. At the end of October, W. Haskell confirmed the number of half of a million in his report for the headquarters of NER in New York. On July 14, 1920 delegation of united Armenia wrote to President W. Wilson about 300,000 refugees in the Republic with 200,000 perished. Taking into account the monthly losses of 30,000 souls in winter and spring of 1919 and the fact, that in autumn the relief was almost equally divided between refugees and local needy, we can estimate 220-250,000 Western Armenian survivors in the final analysis. See: NAA 200/I/193/ Pt. 5/ f. 330-334, 338; 212/ f. 190; 366/ f. 7-8; 557/ Pt. 1-3/ f. 41, 465; 557/ vol. I/ Pt. 1/ f. 457, 513; 430/I/1267/ f. 1-2; New York Times, 29.08.1919; US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/13, 62, 65/Encl.1/T1192/R1; 869 J. 48/1/T1192/R7; Hoover H., 386-387; Great Britain, Foreign Office Archives, Public Record Office (London), class 608 Peace Conference, 1919-1920: correspondence/vol.77, file 342/I/1/doc.31 (following: FO); FO 608/79, 342/I/9/14768. Also: NAA 275/59/1/ f. 142.
Davis and by Colonel J. P. Coombs from ARA. At first, Committee organized 13 hospitals with the American staff and 4 sub-divisions, one of them in Alexandropol. Their first concern was 53.5 thousand kinless orphans and 38,255 children, who retained at least one relative. Children of the second group were cared at home; they profited from soup kitchens, visited baby clinics. What depends on kinless ones, 26,405 of them got asylum in the orphanages on Bosphorus, 21,056 were assembled in the Caucasus. The Constantinople branch had 150 officers, dispersed in Adana, Bardizag, Marzvan, Samsoun, Smyrna, Trebizond, Harberd. At the same time, on March 7 the chief of the ARA, H. Hoover instructed A. C. James, that their office would support the exchange of goods for wheat in the North Caucasus. The ARA was ready to pay half of its cost and to control the procedure through its director at Constantinople H. Heinz. On March 10 H. Hoover required to conclude a contract with the Armenian National Delegation or with other officials, to obtain a guarantee, that stabilized Armenian Government would bear necessary charges in the future. He allowed to multiply food allowances by two, comparing to supplies for other countries.

On April 8, 1919 H. Hoover made an agreement at Paris with Boghos Nubar of the Armenian National Delegation and A. Aharonian, head of the Republican Delegation. On April 28 it was confirmed in Yerevan by H. Heinz and Prime Minister H. Kajaznouni. This document reads as follows: in order to prevent starvation among the Turkish Armenians and assist authorities in the maintenance of order, the ARA agrees to furnish 5,000 tons of flour in April and, if possible, to continue such deliveries in May, June and July. Their distribution was “subject to the general approval” of the ARA; and her statements of account “should be accepted as final and conclusive, as to amount, value and delivery for all foodstuffs”. Their coast made 25¢ per kilogram and included 5% of interest.

Both Delegations, as far as “any successors to them in the government of Armenia, or of any part of Armenia”, were to pay all costs. Accounts should be dollarwise (golden coins), and settled in New York. Several days before Kajaznouni-Heinz meeting, on April 12 Minister of care S. Torosian and Captain J. Elder signed the second agreement. Now the ACRNE had undertaken to maintain all orphanages in Armenia. In performance of this contract, in July of 1919 Yerevan handed 1 million roubles to J. Elder, E. Yarrow and H. Heinz, although such sum was far

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10 NAA 200/1/20/ Pt. I/f. 35-35A; file 638/ Pt. 3/f. 171.
from being enough. Export of commodities, to discharge debts, was welcomed. Besides, special warrant of the Treasury in Yerevan for $5 millions added, that respect of the agreement is guaranteed by all properties of the Republic. Payments should be performed on June 30, 1920-1921. Otherwise, they should continue until full payment. Armenian authorities had also promised to put all necessary buildings at a disposal of the Committee, to make its operations possible.

Then J. Green sent his men to Kouban to buy wheat there; and from May 20 till the end of June, 5 American cargoes with 21 thousand tons of foodstuffs, including dried vegetables, 116 tons of cacao and 205 tons of sugar, arrived at Batum. Part of the wheat and flour was charity, so the net cost of 1 kilogram of corn was 20¢. (In spring of 1920 the net cost of crops would drop to 13¢.) Simultaneously, the New York headquarters of ACRNE received complaints about reign of anarchy: several Americans were robbed just in Yerevan. They required for rescue mission an unfinished construction of gymnasium and building of pedagogical seminary in Astafyan Street, barracks of the old fortress, and an English park in the capital with its edifices. Void building of seminary had been earlier used as a hospital for typhus patients. In their turn, Armenian officials were dissatisfied with the managerial skills of the newcomers. In this “hardly even a shadow” of order we lost trails of 11 orphan kids, which were kept under the tutelage of Andranik Ozanian. He sent them to the Yerevan branch of Committee, when his detachment was disbanded.

In July of 1919 Major S. Forbes opened the ARA office in Yerevan. He was immediately asked, whether military supplies for the national Army were possible. J. Green and chief of the American Military Mission at Tiflis B. Moore confessed in dispatches to Paris that one third of the Armenian republic was inflamed by mutinies, 15-20% of loads were demanded in Georgia for tolls, where trains were hold up for weeks because of economic, political and territorial claims. On July 3 R. Lansing forwarded to the State Department a memorandum by H. Hoover and H. Morgenthau about desperate state of affairs in Armenia. The authors had consulted with General J. Harbord and reported about desirability to separate relief from politics and repatriation. Efforts of charity should be strengthened. The second, with its military aspects, might be approved by Congress. They also suggested that J. Harbord should make fact-finding mission to Armenia; and Colonel W. Haskell

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11 NAA 200/1/303/ f. 13; 205/1/619/1-1A; 275/5/91/ f. 138, 140-141.
could be sent on there as the temporary Allied commissioner.

Memorandum claimed that the Republic of Armenia had been the center of suffering. H. Hoover asserted that repatriation of the Western Armenians, their restoration to peaceful life and the mere functioning of enlarged state required $300 millions, 60 thousands of foreign troops, well-trained local gendarmerie and access to the oil of Mesopotamia. He added that account supplies were sufficient till the end of September, and the whole task of salvation needed the government funds. On July 9 A. Aharonian and Boghos Nubar sent a note to the Chairman of the Peace conference with the telegram which arrived from Yerevan. They had reminded that ¾ of refugees would die unless their repatriation made a reality in summer, so that they could cultivate their soil.

There was certain activity in Constantinople, too. Dr. C. Ussher tried to reveal there, whether it had been possible for refugees to come their homes at Van, Bitlis and Erzerum. He praised Turkish sovereignty over these provinces and promised to restore agriculture, to build roads with American money and to subordinate native Ottoman gendarmerie to American officers. He had interviews with two Turkish ministers of interior. The first of them, Ali Kemal Bey, gave the missionary a letter of recommendation to meet the Grand Vizier in Paris. As a result Ali Kemal was called before the Cabinet and dismissed at once. The second one, acting minister Edhem Bey, kept the newsmen informed that C. Ussher’s simple-minded scheme consisted of administrative autonomy for these provinces, subject to condominium of Turkey and America. The USA would pay expenses of reforms and would be reimbursed with collected taxes. Later, when C. Ussher returned from Paris to Tiflis, B. Moore reported that the Armenian government, American consulate, his military mission, E. Yarrow and J. Green did not assent his plans.

In response to all evidence, on July 16 H. Hoover wrote a memorandum for the Paris Peace conference, and two days later G. Clemenceau appealed to Tiflis with a sharp rebuke. It really helped to bring the traffic in order. However, from April, 1919 till June it was possible to provide Armenia with 50 thousand tons of provisions, including 3.3 thousand tons of milk, 500 tons of quinine and soap. In July there were 28 ACRNE orphanages in republic. Usually an orphanage cared for 200 souls, and

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the Yerevan area alone contained 15 thousands of parentless children.

Later, when new chief of the agency, W. N. Haskell, arrived on August 15 in Tiflis as the Allied High Commissioner (for relief) in Armenia, the situation rather improved. He had cabled to G. Clemenceau that needed soldiers there, and set to reorganize the frame of relief, creating 6 districts with 70 employees. All of them: at Karaklis (Dr. Pratt, Majors C. Livingston, McAlbin), Kars (E. Fox, director of orphanages V. Artzrouny), Sarighamish (Captain Kinne), Yerevan (Colonels C. Ford, C. Telford, Lieutenant Colonels R. A. Dunford, French, H. W. Stephenson, Major E. L. Dyer; Captains J. Dangerfield Jr., D. F. McDonald; L. O. Fossum, Dr. C. D. Ussher of ABCFM, director of the ARA Major S. Forbes) or Alexandropol (Major L. K. Davis, Lieutenant Colonel D. A. Robinson, Captain Soucy, director of orphanages Captain Warner) were subordinated to Tiflis (chief of staff J. Rhea, later E. L. Daley; Major J. C. Green of ARA). The central food dump was in Alexandropol, where 50 to 60 thousands of refugees had been stationed in barracks at Kazachiy Post. In August of 1920 C. Ussher and new Director General of the NER’s Caucasian branch E. A. Yarrow also moved here. As heads of missionaries J. L. Barton and W. Peet stated in their confidential report after an inspection tour to the Caucasus, it was necessary to equip Armenians with means of self-defense, including 10,000 rifles, 100 machine guns, 10 million rounds of ammunition and 30,000 units of clothing. Besides, the subordination of Armenian districts to Tiflis did not refer to military matters and to communication with the Commissioner himself. These issues were managed by the chief of Yerevan district14.

On August 21-24 W. Haskell and his wife made their first voyage to Armenia, visiting Yerevan, Alexandropol and Karaklis. During his talks with the Prime Minister A. Khatisian on August 21, the Colonel could not promise any detachments for Armenia. However, he planned to manage all issues and to send his officers to Turkey, except Cilicia. At the same time he remarked that refugees could not return homes in that area as minimum until the spring of 1920. He had blamed Azerbaijan for rebellions in the Republic, promised to Yerevan authorities arms, provisions and their successful transit across Georgia, proposed his officers as governing instructors for the army and railways. Apart from purchases of

cartridges, political contacts with A. Denikin were unwelcome. W. Haskell also promised to secure Armenian borders, keeping the Sharour-Nakhichevan area detached; he undertook to settle boundary disputes in Transcaucasia and to ameliorate the food crisis.

He thought that Republic of Armenia would be supplied with flour, tinned goods, medicines and agricultural implements for winter. The roster had been replenished by clothing for fugitives and soldiers, including 150 loaded mules with Lebel rifles. The U.S. Administration could not give credits until it settled the matter of mandates, but the private sources overseas could lend $50 millions. The High commissioner claimed that the Armenian Question was already solved at the Conference and now it remained merely to decide the name of a mandatory and exact border lines. He had been an exclusive political representative of his country; so he meant to establish a home in Yerevan and to arrange voyages through the whole Transcaucasia, to Constantinople and Paris. Meantime, Armenians should “do nothing but defend themselves, inasmuch as any modification of the border lines would not have any significance”. On August 22, in his speech at the Parliament, W. Haskell had a little bit changed his tone. Now he had promised to detain British detachments or to replace them by other troops. In his report for the Allies officer had noted that local conditions were “horrible beyond description”.15

At the time of his arrival “the Azerbaijanese under Turkish officers started invasions and massacres of border villages. …In one village on June 7 the Azerbaijanese killed 640 Armenian women and girls”.16 Colonel had to establish a neutral zone and to assign officers to Nakhichevan (Colonel E. Daley), Davalou (Lieutenant Colonel J. Shalley), Alaverdi (Major C. Livingston) and Akhalkalak (Payoton).18

The central office had sections of administration, investigation of

16 Hoover H., p. 388. He refers to the massacres in Shoushi on June 4-7, and to the losses at Ghaibalishen. See also: NAA 200/1/362/ Pt. 1/f. 32-43A.
17 Now it’s Ararat.
actual conditions and needs, of operation of orphanages, hospitals and industrial work, of purchase, storage, transportation and distribution, as also of preparation of budgets, disbursements auditing and exchange. Each district had the commander and a regional supply committee presided over by a chairman, acting under the instructions of the Minister of Supply of Armenia S. Araratian. Committees were responsible for the distribution of flour and bread. They had all necessary data as to the number of needy people, their points of allocation and amount of flour required. The Armenian Government charged for a quarter of all flour and bread issued to people who could pay for it. The rest was distributed gratuitously to the army, the destitute, refugees, orphans and hospitals.

(In January of 1920 soldiers and working refugees were given 1 pound of flour or 1.33 pound of bread per day, not working refugees and orphans received 0.50 pound of flour or 0.66 pound of bread. Every rank and file in the Army, stationed in the district, had been also granted with 1 pound of soap.) And the NER’s bakeries had been established where possible. Employees of the Armenian Government had a right to inspect the warehouses; however, they could not order, or prevent issues. The central authorities provided all districts by gratuitous firewood and signed bills to meet the freight charges, at amount of $11.5 millions.

On September 21-24, 1919 W. Haskell accomplished new inspection tour to Kars, Alexandropol, Karaklis and Yerevan, accompanied by Mrs. Haskell. On September 23 he participated in the long-term session of the Council of Ministers. Now the Yerevan authorities had expressed their aspiration to put the railway communication with Persia in order and demanded to disburden the school buildings of orphanages, accommodated at them. They had been undertaking a task to educate parentless children at schools, had been discussing the matters of Zangezour and Nakhichevan, supported the most close cooperation with the NER.

On September 27 the Commissioner sent to the headquarters of the NER at New York his report. He had written that Turkish and Tartar emissaries were inciting local Muslims; as a result, the Armenian population had been compelled to abandon Igdir. It had also been pressed at Kars and Yerevan. Food supplies were available until December 1, meanwhile 800 thousand souls, 250 thousands of them homeless and 150 thousands children required assistance until fall of 1920. At the time of report 55 Americans of the Committee provided nourishment of 40

thousand orphans. To save these people, 7,000 tons of wheat flour were needed monthly, beginning from December 1. Over half of grain came from Novorossiysk, and at least one cargo should arrive every three months. The list of goods included ordinary tools, farming implements and kitchen utensils, shoes, clothing, needles, building nails, electric light bulbs, window glass, soap, quinine, other simple drugs, at a gross value of $500 thousands. All these articles could be traded for local output.

In addition, W. Haskell had appealed to start a supervision of the Batum-Alexandropol railroad, as it was envisaged by the agreement between Georgia and Armenia, signed on October 3, 1919 with the intermediary of the American acting High Commissioner, Colonel J. Rhea, and Major C. Livingston. On the same October 3 members of the Yerevan Cabinet knew that during two last months H. Kajaznouni was successfully negotiating at Paris with the Chicago International Corporation Ltd., to secure additional supplies, $50 millions worth. These supplies were provided with a three-year credit, with an annual interest of 6%.

As W. Haskell wrote in his next reports, refugees at Alexandropol had been widely engaged in public works; and 30,255 orphans from 49 orphanages of the Republic, together with women, were employed in light industry. When the Prime Minister A. Khatisian visited Alexandropol on November 1-9, he had also registered numerous weaving workshops, and a proper order at warehouses. 1,800 diseased were treated in 14 hospitals of the NER. On October 25 the Armenian Ministry of Education successfully supplied orphanages with text-books, teachers and officers for physical instruction. The Near East Relief had also consolidated its shelter homes into larger orphanages at Yerevan and Alexandropol.

Besides, a commission, composed of 8 men from its headquarters, J. Barton, Chairman, made a thorough investigation of every relief station in the Near East. When in Armenia they testified that cold and starvation would collect an equally dreadful yield of death in winter and sping of 1920, because all humane possibilities to resist them on local means had been exhausted long ago. C. Vickrey had written to the Secretary of State R. Lansing that everybody here was of the H. Harbord mission’s opinion concerning reign of “misery unadorned” in the Republic of Armenia. Missionaries J.H.T.Main and E.L.Smith, who knew the horrible conditions in the republic from March till the middle of May, 1919, gave on October 10 a testimony of the similar nature in the sub-Committee of the Committee of Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate.\(^21\)

These conditions were depicted in letters by the diplomatic representative of the Republic of Armenia, G. Pasdermajian, to the Department of State in Washington, and its chief. G. Pasdermajian stressed eminently humanitarian, not political nature of the rescue operation, which might be continued till the autumn of the next year. Apart of 7,000 tons of farina every month, community needed 35 tons of seed, 60 locomotives, 1,000 freight cars, 600 motor trucks, and clothing for 700 thousands of refugees, uniforms and shoes for 30 thousands of troops. Appeals by G. Pasdermajian were not without result, and on November 27, 1919 R. Lansing cabled to the Acia that President W. Wilson had authorized the sale of 35 tons of wheat and flour at $108 per ton, to the government at Yerevan. Next day “West Raritan” sailed with the first consignment, the second vessel followed her on November 30\textsuperscript{22}.

On the whole, work and relationship of the relief agencies with Armenian authorities were not smooth. It was windy at hospitals with paneless windows, shortage of bedding, poor hygiene and scarce food. Orphanages had often occupied school buildings. In February of 1920 in Karaklis 400-500 orphans would fill edifice, assigned for 125 pupils. Relations were especially tense in Alexandropol, where the commandant of garrison General Major Khachaturov had objected to augmentation of refugees and their settlement in the Kars direction. He was afraid of possible Turkish assaults. When complaints about American employee Warner became especially strong, W. Haskell asked to afford him at least one regiment for the winter, so that he could protect communications and restore order. In the future, this regiment could serve as nucleus for local constabulary. And, if an appeal of the chief of the NER was confined by a regiment in 2,000 men, the Senate and the Armenian delegation at Paris were operating with number of 50,000 soldiers\textsuperscript{23}.

As W. Haskell reported on October 14, with a withdrawal of the British troops Kurds and Tartars “believed Allies were finally abandoning Armenia.” Afterwards the Armenian Ministry of War confirmed: Payoton, on his trip from Akhalkalak to Chlîdîr, was astonished at a mili-

\textsuperscript{22} NAA 200/1/20/ Pt. 3/ f. 183-185; 357/ Pt. 8/ f. 619-620; 431/ Pt. 1/ f. 56-58; US NA, RG 59, 860 J. 48/12T1192/R7.

tary training in the Kanarbel village, on the lakeside of Khozapin. It was arranged by an Azerbaijani staff-captain, sent to organize riots. Payoton had reported about abundant arms, machine guns and cannons in Kizilkilis and in a village of Kara Papahs, named Karakala\textsuperscript{24}.

On December 18-21 W. Haskell came to the Republic after his recent arrival from Paris. On the first day of his visit head of the Government A. Khatisian, Minister of finance and supply S. Araratian and Minister of care and labor A. Babalian had convoked a conference with Colonel in Yerevan. Head of the NER was accompanied by the chief of political section P. C. Kalloch Jr., commander of provisions Yulia and by a representative of Commissioner on the spot, Colonel C. Telford. The Armenian officials had complained that they were debarred from the distribution of foodstuffs. They had been of the opinion, that this process should be managed by a governmental committee, and only that agency could sell condensed milk, sugar, haricot and garments. With the return of Koghb it had been possible to recover the salt-mining, and in common with a wholesales of cotton it substantially helped to stabilize roubles. As far as 44\% of the relief was pure charity, America’s control and involvement were perfectly justified. However, Armenian authorities knew that long-term loans would be settled by their own society. Thence, they could not stay indifferent to such an important matter.

Problems of sowing were discussed in detail. It was necessary to use local means at a maximum, because in December the ARA had to complete its activities in Armenia. Some quantity of wheat could be bought at the Northern Caucasus; however, Caucasian authorities did not want to see their output at the Georgian markets. That’s why the Commissioner had engaged himself to dispatch wheat under the American flag. Major P. Kalloch had to manage an exchange of American goods in the Republic for seed wheat, barley and millet. W. Haskell did not also raise objections to the English instructors for the Armenian army. He had promised to come to terms with the British, in order to transit Armenian units from the North Caucasus through Georgia to the native land. These, newly conscripted soldiers ought to reinforce the national army substantially\textsuperscript{25}.

During his next arrival, on January 30 - February 4, 1920 W. Haskell (with his wife and 8 attendants, among them military attaché of the republic S. H. Bekzadian) spent first three days at Alexandropol, where

\textsuperscript{24} NAA 200/1/353/ Pr. 2/ f. 107, 109; 638/ Pt. 1/ f. 56.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 200/1/20/ Pr. 3/ f. 148-148B; 175/ Pr. 3/ f. 241; 357/ Pr. 9/ f. 710; 362/ Pr. 2/ f. 167; 427/ Pr. 1/ f. 28-28A; 429/ Pr. 2/ f. 96-96A; 439/ Pr. 1/ f. 30-32A; 638/ Pr. 1-2/ f. 1-2, 14-16, 46-52, 124-125, 135-136; 205/1/636/305.
the Colonel made a speech at an inauguration of the University. Then he visited the capital, Etchmiadzin, Karaklis, and on February 4 came with the Prime Minister A.Khatissian to Kars. The Commissioner was welcomed by flags and mass rally of the Western Armenians; they demanded to speed-up the unification. W. Haskell had evaluated the state of affairs as excellent especially emphasizing efficiency and expansion of agencies at Kars. The quantity of beggars in the streets decreased, their appearance improved and “you would almost nowhere meet desolated children”.

As the republican Ministry of agriculture estimated, 181.2 tons of the seed corn, shipped before the middle of March, was enough for society to subsist on its own from the autumn crop. Farthermore, it would be possible to manage without additional grain credits. The American was worried about the cotton trade. The government of the Republic had its reasons to be worried, too. In the letter by A. Khatissian, addressed to H. Kajaznouni on February 6, the author mentioned, that Yerevan officials actually disliked meddling of the Committee in matters of administration and the very fact that the NER had its autonomous militia. This, inner police, put its employees under arrest, giving grounds for official protests. On the whole, contradictions remained in force both in 1919, and in 192026.

On March 3-9 W. Haskell had his routine visit to Sarighamish, Kars, Alexandropol, Yerevan, Etchmiadzin and Karaklis. Contracting parties agreed to decrease cotton prices and to buy five “Ford” tractors and 11 ploughs of the “Oliver” system. Most troubling were matters of deliveries from Batum, agriculture and of the internal political situation27.

During his next visit on April 17-19, 1920 it was already possible to ascertain that minimal sowing requirements had been met, and the Republic got additional 27.2 tons of seeds. Right to the point of May unrest at Alexandropol, work was done in a proper way; however, on May 4 W. Haskell quickly moved all 40 officers of his headquarters into Batum; and his 24 employees, led by C. Telford, were more than three weeks absent from Yerevan. It had provoked grain crisis when feeding stations were closed and bakers’ shops attacked. Newly appointed Prime Minister H. Ohanjanian tried to make Americans stay at the Republic. The Colonel himself had remained in Batum for two months; however,

on May 6 some 60 cars of flour and child feeding set already out on a journey to the Sanahin station, and further on, to Alexandropol28.

Following months aggregated all activities of the High Commissioner who had to complete his duty on August 1. Now cotton, construction materials, rugs, tobacco and sheepskins were a main instrument of the foreign commerce. In 1919-20 their export increased to 20%; and cotton had been particularly attractive. Englishmen and the French strived to control this stuff. From September of 1919 till February of 1920 the Republic of Armenia sold more than 95 tons of it at $1.25¢ per kilo. At the same time 1.5-2,000 local spinners, working at home, had produced 160,180 meters of cotton canvas, partially distributed in Etchmiadzin, Nor Bayazet (Gavar), Ghamarlou (Artashat), Ashtarak. With the main textile center at Etchmiadzin, canvas was transformed into garments and linen. Articles produced had been issued to orphanages, hospitals and needy. The Cotton Monopoly was state property which provided 332% of profit in summer of 1919. However, by the 6 March, 1920 H. Hoover and C. Telford had cut down the rate of return to 200%. It is a well-known fact that in a wealthy society profit rates are low. And the high rate of exploitation is a symptom of poverty.

When we sum up the results, we should note that the agreement of April 8, 1919 generated correlative negotiations from August 7, 1919 till January of 1920. The Yerevan cabinet, represented by H. Kajaznouni, had arranged an agreement with the Chicago International Corporation, Ltd. It included delivery of cargo into the port on the Black Sea, insurance and charges, or transfer of articles in New York to a procurement commission, nominated by Yerevan. The matter had been reported to the Secretary of State and President W. Wilson. On November 14, 1919 the first official authorized the Grain Corporation "to sell to the Armenian government on credit or otherwise 35 thousand tons of wheat and wheat flour"29. The Rockefeller Foundation granted $1-1.25 million for the sea shipping. This sum formed 2-2.5% of the cargo value.

At the beginning 1 kilogram of wheat cost more than $1.4; but after half of a year discussions 18,408 metric tons of wheat were sold at a price of 12 cents. Consumer complaints might be pressed during 15-30

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days after purchase; and arbitrary decision had been adopted immediately. At the final text freight and insurance had been advanced by the NER; and first vessels sailed out of Baltimore and New York on November 26 ("West Raritan"), November 29 ("Delisle") and December 10 ("West Pocasset"). To clear expenses, Government of the Republic of Armenia furnished its notes for an American bank, which in 1919-20 settled accounts with the Chicago International. After the first year and a half of collaboration, these notes might be replaced by the state bonds.

Their issue constitutes an independent and intriguing essay. On June 5 and 10, 1920 discussing an Act of Armenian independence loan, the bureau-government of H. Ohanjanian was preparing to borrow $20 millions to cover ARA bread charges. Loan included 6% return from capital; 8.5% of it would be paid off annual, in 1923-1930. In a total, Yerevan authorities would pay $22.9 millions. Giving publicity to the bread credits and to reduced prices, which were fixed by official Washington, Armenian State institutions had scheduled next consignment of goods. To repay them, they produced golden bonds of independent Armenia, placed at Constantinople, Tiflis and Batum. At first, they should amount $50 millions with 7% of return, with additional 2.5% every year, when a bond’s nominal would be repaid. To reduce possible risks, Armenian officials divided $20 millions of the first, American loan into two shares. The bigger one, $15 millions, was reserved. As to the second bonds, their repayment ($54.75 millions) was prolonged till March 1, 1921-1980.

Thus, authorities of the Republic of Armenia had got from the U.S. Treasury values, $15.5 millions worth. Then they borrowed from their citizens $50 millions of gold and dollars, enjoying Washington’s confidence towards their State. Such involvement of the private capital was inherent feature of H. Hoover’s program. Large private investments had reflected the real value of good international relations; although subscription in Georgia produced scanty results, and wealthy Armenians of Tiflis ignored this enterprise. This affair had its negative sides, too. Launched without proper calculations at the end of August 1920, Armenia witnessed high level of inflation. Her cheques decreased in value 7 times, and their rate of exchange went down to 7,000 for $1.30.

In total, Republic of Armenia received 119,149 tons of foodstuffs

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(including 41,216 tons of wheat), 16,614 tons of clothing, medicines and other goods, worth $28,795,426. $12,671,722 of this sum was donated through the ACRNE, the NER and the Red Cross; $15,492,304 was allocated by the ARA and the Grain Corporation; $631,400 was loans from the Great Britain. As a conclusion we can assert, that charity serves a core and a premise of the state relief programs, which are not isolated from politics, although they are not pure political. The trend to render assistance comes into being as a social phenomenon and common reaction to the deep crises. When it arrived, even at amount of $57.6 per person, it had ensured for everyone under the care 238.3 kilograms of vitally important provisions. These wheat and basic items were crucial for the survival of 350,000 souls out of the half of a million refugees. Therefore, the relief as itself can not be ignored by the sphere of management. Appreciation and adequate estimation of the remedy received improve the social atmosphere; they help to abate the trauma and its negative effects, positively impact upon both sides. Benevolence and aid contribute to relations of patronage and cultural partnership. They may be accompanied by economic advantages; whereas militarization of bilateral relations is embarrassed. Just as emergency medicine, swift, exact and timely rendered relief may prove to be decisive even for large areas.

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Note 32: Last figures might be corrected, as we see in footnote 9, because local dwellers had been also assisted by the NER. Refugees and local destitutes combined had comprised up to 750,800,000 human beings.
In 1918-1920, the system of assistance from the USA to the Republic of Armenia grew from 1 representative (J. Elder) to a network of committees, the US Administration of Aid and the Office of the High Commissioner for Allied forces. In September-December 1918, the RA adopted 9 laws on refugees; on April 8, 12, and 28, 1919, a number of bilateral agreements were signed; on November 14, President V. Wilson entrusted the RA authorities with 35,000 tons of grain to be sold on credit. Starting from summer 1919 and in 1920, rescue operations covered 700-800 thousand people throughout the Caucasus, including 500,000 Western Armenians in the republic. Here, for each protectorate, 238.3 kg of food valued at 57.6 dollars was distributed. In the RA, 350,000 victims were saved, and the prices of grain were 12-20 cents for 1 kg, 44% of the goods were donations. In this, public programs of the USA began earlier and lasted longer than those of the states. The assistance given had serious social and cultural consequences, positively affecting the fate of the republic and its residents.